https://media.defense.gov/2019/Aug/06/2002167167/-1/-1/1/Q3FY2019_LEADIG_OIR_REPORT.PDF
PARTIAL DRAWDOWN OF U.S. TROOPS DECREASES RESOURCES
AND SUPPORT TO U.S.-BACKED SYRIAN FORCES
CJTF-OIR completed a partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria this quarter, leaving
behind a residual force in northeastern Syria and around a desert garrison near the Jordanian
border.38
Following the drawdown, CJTF-OIR continued to advise and assist Syrian partner
forces as they conducted clearing operations and detained suspected ISIS members and
facilitators.39
As it drew down forces, CJTF-OIR stated that the reduction in personnel, equipment, and a
change of mission to counterinsurgency required the Special Operations Joint Task ForceOIR, a component of CJTF-OIR, to perform more partnered training, equipping, and
reinforcing of the SDF to enable the SDF to conduct counterinsurgency operations. CJTF-OIR
said that the partial drawdown had occurred at a time when these fighters need additional
training and equipping to build trust with local communities and to develop the human-based
intelligence necessary to confront ISIS resurgent cells and insurgent capabilities in Syria.40
According to CJTF-OIR, the drawdown of U.S. forces in Syria also reduced the ability of
CJTF-OIR to maintain “visibility” at the al Hol IDP camp, forcing it to rely on third-party
accounts of the humanitarian and security situation there. CJTF-OIR said that it lacks the
resources to monitor the camp directly, and that the SDF was only capable of providing
“minimal security”—a deficiency that CJTF-OIR said has created conditions that allow ISIS
ideology to spread “uncontested” in the camp.41