https://andrewgreenway.substack.com/p/in-permanence-crisis
A government that is serious about state capacity must do 2 things, urgently and in parallel:
One, fundamentally reboot the character of the ‘permanent’ civil service, beginning with an independent Royal Commission like the Victorian-era Northcote-Trevelyan report that founded the modern bureaucracy.
And two, create new institutions that adopt the working styles, technologies and affordances given to public officials who have shown how the state can do great things in special circumstances. A corollary of creating new institutions is that some existing, legacy organisations must be encouraged to wither and die.
This is a very plain blog with quotes from and links to articles I found interesting, thought-provoking, or relevant to the times. Linking is neither endorsement nor condemnation. Run by http://willslack.com
04 April, 2026
I talked tech with third graders for 90 minutes. Here's what happened.
https://www.thehomescreen.org/p/i-talked-tech-with-third-graders
We need to stop focusing on specific products and platforms and focus on the roots of the problem:
Algorithmic mediation that invisibly shapes our experiences
Business models that feed off of “engagement” (aka addiction)
Data that is extracted, amassed, and weaponized against users—jacking up prices, targeting kids with predatory content, and keeping you scrolling.
TikTok or Instagram or Roblox or whatever… the products are not THE problem. They are the SYMPTOM of the problem(s). If 8-year olds can get it, surely our policymakers can.
how the CIA and MI6 got hold of Putin’s Ukraine plans and why nobody believed them
Putin’s tiny planning circle also played a role, creating a hopelessly cocky plan that had not been subjected to a rigorous critique by intelligence professionals versed in Ukrainian realities. Russian troops entered Ukraine expecting a surgical regime change operation with little resistance, rather than the bitter battles that awaited them. Moscow did not bother with many actions that western military analysts had assumed would accompany the invasion, such as taking out Ukraine’s power and communications networks. The Russian army assumed they would control most of the country in a matter of days, so decided to make the subsequent occupation easier by keeping the infrastructure intact. Instead, the working mobile networks and ready power supply proved crucial for the coordination of Ukraine’s hastily assembled defence forces.
“Half of it is we overestimated Russian military performance and underestimated the Ukrainian military,” said Michael Kofman, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington. “But the other half is the Russians didn’t execute the operation remotely how many anticipated it might go, or in a way that made sense.”
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